No matter the region of the world under study, party (system) 
to be a widespread agreement that whether in Africa (Lindberg 2007; Weghorst and Bernhard 2014) , Asia (Johnson 2002; Hicken 2006) , Europe (Lewis 1994; Morlino 1998) 
or Latin
America (Dix 1992; Mainwaring and Scully 1995) , few institutional developments are more critical to the endurance and healthy functioning of democracy than the institutionalization of both political parties and party systems (Abeje 2013; Diamond and Linz 1989; Kuenzi and Lambright 2005; Tavits 2005) . As a result, P(S)I has traditionally been considered to be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the survival of democracy (Mainwaring 1999; Arter and Kestilä-Kekkonen 2014) .
However, and despite having become one of the most repeated statements in the democratization literature, such close relationship between institutionalization and democracy
has not yet been sufficiently proved beyond a myriad of countries (Johnson 2002; Mainwaring 1999; Markowski 2001 ) and/or regional (Lewis 2006; Kneuer 2011 ) studies. In fact, when tested in a larger number of cases, 'the correlation [has proved to be] not as impressive as theory predicts' (Basedau 2007: 125) , not to say negative (Stockton 2001) or even inexistent (Thames and Robbins 2007) , putting into question Huntington's and Mainwaring's seminal concerns about the benefits of both party institutionalization (PI) and party system institutionalization (PSI) for the durability of democracy (Hicken and Kuchonta 2014) . 1 Notwithstanding what has been said, and taking into consideration that the relationship between institutionalization and democracy may not be as unidirectional or linear as expected (Schedler 1995; Wallis 2003) , the present article revisits the abovementioned relationship but differs from previous studies in the following manner. First of all, it distinguishes between PSI and PI. Secondly, it tries to improve the way in which both phenomena have been operationalized, by measuring the whole process of Any scholar studying the institutionalization of party systems faces the problem of the unit of analysis: political parties, party systems, or both? Surprisingly enough, and notwithstanding an ever growing number of systematic comparative works and countless case-studies, most scholars (e.g. Kreuzer and Pettai 2003; Lewis 2006; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Tóka 1997; etc.) still approach the institutionalization of individual parties and party systems as two interchangeable and synonymous concepts, 'the implication being that [since individual political parties constitute integral parts of the whole party system] the institutionalization of the party system directly depends on that of individual parties' (Meleshevich 2007: 16) .
The relationship between these two notions is, however, not nearly so 'simple and deterministic' (Markowski 2001: 56) : while individual political parties may be institutionalized, their operation in a party system may not be. In this sense, Randall and Svåsand argue that, although closely related, 'individual PI and the institutionalization of the party system are neither the same thing nor necessarily and always mutually compatible ' (2002: 6) . Moreover, they 'could be at odds ' (2002: 8) , particularly in the case of young democracies. As a result of this lack of conceptual clarity or absence of consistent analytical frameworks, research on PSI and PI has thus far led to inconclusive, in many cases even contradictory, assessments on the relationship between institutionalization and democracy. It is for this reason that I will turn to the distinction between these two phenomena first, trying to put some flesh on the bones of both concepts.
Party System Institutionalization
Although it may be difficult to believe given its central importance, the concept of PSI has no established definition. The concept was first introduced by Mainwaring and Scully in their classic Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America. There, the authors defined the institutionalization of a party system as:
[the] process by which a practice or organization becomes well established and widely known, if not universally accepted. Actors develop expectations, orientations, and behaviour based on the premise that this practice or organization will prevail into the foreseeable future (1995: 4).
According to these two authors, institutionalized party systems are characterised by four different dimensions: regular patterns of inter-party competition, strong party roots in society, electoral and partisan legitimacy, and solid party organizations. While their discussion of the four dimensions is certainly insightful, Mainwaring and Scully failed to provide objective measures for the last two dimensions (i.e. legitimacy and party organization).
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Most authors follow Mainwaring and Scully's pattern of proposing a series of 'dimensions' of PSI. Morlino (1998) claims that 'structured' party systems must be stable in terms of electoral behaviour, partisan competition and political class; Bielasiak (2001) , who is interested in the institutionalization of party systems in Eastern Europe and post-Soviet States, distinguishes three dimensions of stability: electoral democracy, political contestation, and political representation; Kreuzer and Pettai assert, from a different perspective, that PSI 'is ultimately shaped by the interaction of both politicians' organizational affiliations and voters' electoral choices ' (2003: 81) ; and, even more explicitly, Meleshevich (2007) conceives of it as involving both (external) autonomy and (internal) stability. More recently, Lindberg (2007) simply puts institutionalization on a level with stabilization. Randall and Svåsand (2002) is the only exception to this principle of simply enumerating dimensions but, notwithstanding its originality, their framework does not provide us with any means of operationalization.
[ Table 1 around here] It follows from this brief review, then, that political scientists have conceptualized PSI in numerous ways. Most agree on some dimensions of the notion but not many arrive at the same final combination (Table 1) . Criticism of the conceptual and operational approaches of these studies appears elsewhere , but the fundamental problem running through all these works is that, more preoccupied with an empirical assessment of institutionalization, they tend to pay very little attention to conceptualization per se.
However, as we know from the literature, for an empirical analysis to be valid it is essential first to establish a sound conceptual base (Della Porta and Keating 2008) . Only then scholars can take care of matching such conceptual framework with the most appropriate measures (Adcock and Collier 2001) . How, then, can we define PSI?
Strictly speaking, we can only speak of institutionalization when we are able to define what it is that has been institutionalized. Our first task then is, perhaps, insurmountable to specify the 'essence' of what constitutes a given party system. Sartori offers the clearest definition of a party system as 'the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition ' (1976: 44) . This definition has three main different implications. First, a party system must consist of more than a single party (otherwise there is no inter-party competition). Second, a party system clearly involves something more than the sum of its component parts (i.e. political parties). This way it incorporates some element of understanding of the mode of interaction between the latter. Third, the notion of 'system' implies some degree of regularity, suggesting some continuity of inter-party interactions between elections (Sartori 1976: 43) . Once the nature of what constitutes a party system has been established, it becomes possible to define PSI and, hence, to specify the dimensions determining whether any given system is already institutionalized or still remains underinstitutionalized.
As is clear from what has been said, all meanings of the notion of institutionalization contain the idea of stability and persistence (Riker and Ordeshook 1973 ; see also Table 1 ). In fact, following Mair's (2006) idea that the core of a party system is to be found in the patterns of interaction among its units, that is, political parties, it follows that the most important and necessary attribute of PSI is stability in the rules and nature of inter-party competition (Lindberg 2007 (1995: 4-5) . Therefore, the more stable the system, the more institutionalized it becomes (Mair 2001: 35) .
Bearing in mind all what has been said, and drawing on Huntington's (1968: 12) original definition of institutionalization as the 'process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability', I define PSI as the process by which the patterns of interaction among political parties become routine, predictable and stable over time. 6 In other words, a system of parties can be said to be institutionalized when political parties cooperate, collaborate and colligate in a standardized and structured way -a way that is independent of the relevant issues in each moment and which random shocks cannot alter (Mainwaring 1998) . On the contrary, in under-institutionalized party systems political parties are incapable of interacting in any patterned manner, failing to present voters with clearly stable political alliances and, therefore, predictable governmental alternatives (Mair 2001: 39) .
Party Institutionalization
Although widely employed in the literature, the concept of PI has been more often than not poorly and/or ambiguously defined; while some scholars have used the term without further clarification, others -as we have previously seen -have tended to simply equate it with that of PSI. The result has been a lingering uncertainty about its 'real' meaning.
Although the notion of institutionalization had been previously employed in relation to political organizations, Huntington (1968) was the first scholar to apply it to the analysis of political parties. However, he did not dedicate much time to its definition (just one sentence), and preferred to focus on its (four) dimensions: namely, adaptability, autonomy, complexity, coherence.
Most scholars have preferred to follow Huntington's seminal approach of merely suggesting a series of dimensions of institutionalization, hastening to operationalize them.
For some, the notion of PI is uni-dimensional. But while for Janda a party is institutionalized exclusively when it is 'reified in the public mind ' (1980: 19) , for Rose and Mackie (1988) electoral continuity (i.e. more than three national elections) is the only dimension. For the majority, PI needs to be treated as a multi-dimensional phenomenon. However, while for Panebianco (1988) PI has only two dimensions (i.e. autonomy and systemness), for Harmel and Svåsand (1993; Harmel et al. (forthcoming) ), or McGuire (1997) the concept has a tridimensional character: namely, routinization, survival/rootedness and reification. Jin (1995) agrees also with the first two, adding a different 'party efficacy in the legislative process' as a third dimension. Other scholars, like Dix's (1992) , simply adopt Huntington's conceptual framework but incorporating a completely new set of operationational indicators.
As with the concept of PSI examined above, the fundamental problem running through most of these works is that they tend to pay little attention to conceptualization per se as they are almost exclusively oriented toward an empirical assessment of institutionalization.
However, it should not be forgotten that any valid empirical analysis needs first a sound conceptual base. In this context, two studies are extremely remarkable, namely: Levitsky's (1998) analysis of the transformation of the Justicialist Party in Argentina, and Randall and Svåsand's (2002) analysis of the institutionalization of political parties in the 'Third World'.
Well aware of the disjuncture between the initial conception of institutionalization and the way it has been elaborated and related to specific criteria by the majority of scholars, Levitsky suggests that 'the concept of [party] institutionalization be unpacked ' (1998: 88) .
Thus, bearing in mind the predominant conceptualizations of institutionalization used in the literature of political parties, Levitsky distinguishes two different elements: (1) value infusion, encompassing rootedness, and denoting a 'shift from the pursuit of particular objectives through an organization to the goal of perpetuating the organization per se ' (1998: 79) ; and (2) behavioural routinization, which covers stable patterns of organization, pointing to entrenched forms of intra-organizational interaction.
Clearly influenced by Levitsky's work, Randall and Svåsand distinguished four different dimensions of PI, understood as 'the process by which [a] party becomes established in terms both of integrated patterns of behaviour and of attitudes, or culture ' (2002: 12) . On the one hand, within the internal sphere, both authors distinguish between systemness (i.e., the increasing scope, density and regularity of the interactions that constitute the party as a structure) and value infusion which refers to the extent to which party actors and supporters acquire an identification with and commitment to a party. On the other hand, the external dimension includes autonomy (i.e., the degree of differentiation from other social groups and methods of behaviour), and reification which, capturing Janda's notion, requires the party's existence to be established in the public imagination (2001: 80). However, as in the case of PSI, they failed to put their own concept to the test. an institutionalized political party needs to display a certain level of legislative (voting and policy) unity (2014: 937).
[ Table 2 around here]
As follows from this discussion, it becomes clear that the concept of PI is 'multifaceted, difficult to operationalize, and sometimes conductive to tautological argument' (Gunther and Hopkin 2002: 193) . However, and despite the fact that no two scholars have arrived at the same set of dimensions (Table 2) , two broad areas of consensus seem to emerge: PI involves a combination of both stable roots in society as well as firmly established/properly routinized organizationally structures. And if we accept, as the majority of scholars does, that institutionalization is characterized by rootedness and systemness (Webb and White 2007: 11) , then it becomes possible to establish a common definition of PI which is then understood as the process by which parties reproduce consistent patterns of mass mobilization and internal organization. In other words, institutionalized political parties are expected to remain stable both at the level of popular support (especially at the moment of elections) as well as in terms of their organizational structure.
How to Measure Institutionalization?
Trying to capture what has been identified as the different dimensions of PSI (i.e. stability) and PI (i.e. rootedness and systemness), I will introduce here two indicators which, for the reasons explained below, are more suitable than other 'more traditional' ones for measuring these two notions. Still, and for the sake of robustness, the analysis in section four will include all indicators (i.e. both 'traditional' and not). index is inadequate to clearly distinguish between party (supply-side) and systemic (demandside) institutionalization (Luna 2014: 412; Birch 2003; Powell and Tucker 2014) .
Party System Institutionalization
For all these reasons, I prefer to rely on Mair's (1997) notion of 'party system closure'
and, more particularly, on Casal Bértoa and Enyedi's (2016) operationalization of it. There are five main reasons for this, namely: a) Considering the structure of inter-party competition for government 'the most important aspect of party systems' (Mair 1997: 206) , it enables to focus on the fundamental 'core' of any party system: namely, the process of partisan interactions (Rokkan 1970; Smith 1989 First of all, the degree to which governing alternations of political parties are wholesale is captured by the so-called Pedersen index of ministerial volatility, which adds the net change in percentage of ministers (including the prime minister) gained and lost by each party from one government to the next, and then dividing by two. However, and because wholesale alternation (both total and none) can be reflected by scores at both extremes of the MV scale (both 100 and 0, respectively), if the MV initial score obtained according to the formula described above is lower than 50 (i.e. perfect partial alternation), the former figure will be subtracted from 100. If MV is higher than 50, the IGA will be equal to the initial MV score.
The second and third criteria are calculated by the percentage of ministers belonging, respectively, to familiar combination of parties and old governing parties, with the caveats presented in Table 2 . The time component -so important in any measurement of institutionalization as a process -is captured by taking into consideration all the years a particular partisan interaction has endured. Finally, and in order to avoid measuring incompatible scores, the standardized Z-scores of the three indicators are combined into one unique measurement (i.e. iPSI), paying due attention to stability as the sole dimension of PSI (Casal Bértoa and Enyedi 2016: 268-70 ).
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Party Institutionalization
The discussion in section one provides clear justification for my choice of the dimensions of the concept of PI. Hence, not only should one be interested in examining the overall rootedness of political parties, one should also be interested in their organizational systemness, employing Panebianco's (1988) terminology.
The degree of PI has been traditionally operationalized in several ways and using multiple indicators: party identification (Dalton and Weldon 2007) ; levels of professionalization (Johnson 2002) and personalism (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006) , the capacity of parties to sponsor parties cross-nationally (Rose and Mackie 1988) , the percentage of independent candidates (Moser 1999) , to name only a few. However, and notwithstanding their validity, none of these indicators is able to measure at the same time both rootedness and systemness. Not even the most widely used indicator of PI that is, the average age of 'relevant' 9 parties (Huntington 1968; Jin 1995; Tavits 2005 100% for the first election, 120% for the second, and 140% for the third) and multiplied by 100. The logic is that, taking notice of both voter stability in voters' electoral preferences (rootedness) and the age of a party organization (systemness), 11 the IPS measures the two dimensions of PI altogether providing us with a final measure of the institutionalization of political parties in a country at the state level.
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Method and Data
The main goal of this article is to empirically test if either PSI or PI (or both) should be considered necessary and/or sufficient conditions for the survival of democracy, as the bulk of the scholarly literature maintains. Traditional statistical analysis, based on correlational and linear-additive models, is unable to provide a proper answer to this question, 13 but
Boolean algebra certainly does (Caramani 2009; Goertz 2003; Mello 2013; Ragin 2008) .
Although constantly referred to in the literature, it has not been until recently that scholars have started to emphasize the relevance of necessary conditions (Goertz and Starr 2003; Goertz 2006) . Because this type of conditions has to be fulfilled every time an outcome is present (see Table 3 ), necessary conditions are essential to 'the process of coaxing generalizations from empirical evidence' (Ragin 2003: 179) and, therefore, should be examined appropriately.
[ Table 3 around here]
Traditionally, scholars would simply try to cluster the different cases available into the two-by-two table displayed above. So if some cases would fall in box 2 while box 1 12 Contrary to the title of Lewis' article, IPS looks more at the continuity of party representation-cumorganization (562, 566) and 'their relative success in elections' (574). I am particularly thankful to one of the reviewers for this point. 13 Logit regression or survival analysis would be perfectly suitable had I wanted to, respectively, explain variation in democratic endurance, measuring the impact PSI and/or PI have had on democratic survival, or analyse how do any of the former factors increase or decrease the probability of the latter phenomenon.
However, as mentioned above, this is not the aim of this article.
remained empty, the specific condition was considered to be necessary for the outcome. If this was not the case, the necessary character of the condition would be denied (Caramani 2009 These same measurements also help to assess at the same time if a certain condition is (or is not) sufficient for the outcome, with the latter taking place every time the former is present. And this is so because coverage scores for necessity also work as consistency scores for sufficiency as well as necessity consistency figures display the coverage of sufficient conditions (Ragin 2008) . All in all, and as it is now well established in the literature (Ragin 2003 (Ragin , 2008 Schneider and Wagemann 2012) , the consistency/coverage threshold for necessary/sufficient conditions is 0.9, while for 'almost necessary/consistent' conditions is just 0.8.
In order to test the relationship between P(S)I and democracy, I have built a new dataset comprising 64 democratic European political regimes between 1848 and 2015.
14 Because I am interested in the impact party competition has on the survival of democracy, a country is considered to be democratic only when (1) it displays at least a score of 6 in the Polity IV index, (2) universal (male) suffrage elections have been held at least once, and (3) governments are formed (and rely) on a parliamentary majority, rather than on the exclusive will of the head of state. 15 Moreover, and because time has proved to be as important for both PI (Dix 1992) and PSI (Mair 1997) as for democratic survival (Huntington 1991 ), I will only analyse here the first twenty-five years after the (re-)inauguration of democracy, as defined above. This will allow me to evaluate analogous periods and avoid faulty comparisons (Casal Moreover, and as Mainwaring has constantly repeated, the problem is that when 15 My case selection not only coincides with most studies in the field (Mainwaring et al. 2016) , but also mostly overlaps with other similar datasets (Boix et al. 2012; Coppedge et al. 2016) . 16 The idea is to avoid situations in which time constitutes the main explanatory variable. Thus, it would be unfair to compare Hungary or any post-communist democracy in 2015 with the UK or any other traditional Western European democracy in the same year as in the latter political parties had four times more time than in the former to interact and, therefore, create a cumulative experience helping them to routinize their behaviour making it more predictable and stable.
institutionalization does not take place, neither at the supra-nor at the infra-level, citizens may become increasingly frustrated with the (democratic) system, leading not only to high levels of social dissatisfaction (e.g. mass demonstrations) and political disengagement (e.g. low turnout), but also to the appearance (and electoral success) of populist parties and demagogic leaders threatening the survival of the regime see also Innes 2002; McGuire 1997) . Indeed, and as Diamond and Linz already stated almost thirty years ago 'the historical evidence […] suggests that the crucial consideration for democracy is … the degree of party [system] institutionalization ' (1989: 21) . 17 It is for all these reasons that when dealing with the question of democratic survival and collapse both types of institutionalization need to be approached complementarily.
[ 
PSI and Democracy
One of the first interesting findings that follow from Figure 1 
Switzerland, Austria and Malta), is to be classified as 'over-institutionalized' (i.e. iPSI˃3).
Another important discovery is that among all those democracies that did not collapse, the earlier a polity democratized the better: namely, PSI tends to be stronger among the first democratised polities. Thus, it is not only that the first democracy in Europe has the most institutionalized party system, but also most post-WWI party systems tend to be more institutionalized than post-WWII, post-fascists and post-communist democracies, in this order. This seems to confirm previous findings that the earlier the 'time of transition' the higher the PSI (Casal Bértoa and Mair 2012; Mainwaring et al. 2016) .
In terms of the relationship between PSI and the survival of democracy in Europe, a quick and simple look at What the previous analysis certainly uncovers, though, is that PSI should be considered as a 'sufficient' 19 condition for the survival of democracy as democracy never collapsed in countries where the structure of partisan interactions had achieved a certain 'minimum' degree of stabilization. Indeed, and contrary to what Stockton (2001: 112, 117) maintained, Figure 1 seems to suggest the existence of a threshold of PSI (iPSI˃0.5) that when surpassed will certainly guarantee the survival of a nation's democratic regime.
In fact, the only country where democracy collapsed despite having an However, it could well be that previous scholars had put so much weight in the process of institutionalization due to the impact low PSI has had on the collapse of democracy in Latin America, Africa or even inter-war Europe. Still, we should remember that causation is not essentially symmetric, meaning that party system under-institutionalization could be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for democratic collapse, even if its opposite is not. It clearly follows from Figure 1 that this has been the case since the nascent of modern democracy in Europe in 1848. Thus, and with the only exception mentioned above, all other instances of regime collapse display low levels of PSI. Moreover, a detailed analysis of the process of party system development in those 18 cases clearly reveals in almost all instances (post-WWII Turkey and Russia being the only exceptions) an increasing progression towards unpredictability, meaning higher frequency of partial alternations, innovative formulae and newly formed parties in government in the years preceding the collapse of the democratic regime.
In consonance with what has been said, the necessity tests reveal a consistency score of 0.92, well above the 0.9 threshold. 22 Conversely, the 'sufficiency hypothesis' is totally rejected with independence of the PSI indicator employed.
[ Table 4 around here]
21 Following Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 31-2) the cutting point here is an ENPP of 4, which distinguishes 'extreme pluralist' (ENPP≥4) party systems from the rest: namely, 'limited pluralist' (ENPP between 3 and 3.9), two-and-a-half (ENPP between 2.5 and 2.9) and bi-party (ENPP<2.5) systems.
A confirmation of the previous results is also to be found in Table 4 , which crosstabulates the percentage of countries with institutionalized party systems and democratic survival or collapse according to the different 'democratization' periods. 23 What the above table reveals, however, is that while still relevant, the positive impact of PSI for democratic endurance has decreased over time. Thus, we have passed from a period (before WWII)
where it was both a necessary and sufficient condition, to a period (during the Southern European wave) where it was a sufficient and 'almost necessary' condition, to a final (i.e. current) period when it is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for the survival of democracy. This coincides with one of the initial findings that earlier democracies tend to have higher institutionalized party systems. However, if there is one thing that has remained constant all the way since 1848 is the necessary relationship between the absence of PSI and democratic collapse.
Another, and perhaps even more relevant finding, follows from a comparison of Table   4 with Table A that while more democracies with stable structures of inter-party competition than with stable electorates or concentrated legislatures survived, the percentage of democracies presenting inchoate competitive patterns that collapsed was also higher than those characterised by high volatility and fragmentation. And this can also be observed at the period-level where, in some cases, the identification of stable electorates (e.g. 1989-2015) or concentrate legislatures (e.g. -1914, and 1945-73) when predicting democratic survival is not very useful as almost as many democracies of the same systemic characteristics (i.e. low volatility and fragmentation) collapsed. All in all, this seems to confirm the higher suitability of using iPSI, rather than the two other more traditional proxies (i.e. TEV and ENPP), as an indicator when looking at the relationship between PSI and democracy.
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PI and Democracy
Similarly to what has been previously observed, there seems also to be a clear geographical cleavage between East and West in terms of PI. In fact, and as it follows from Figure 2 , only five out of nineteen Eastern European democracies are considered to have institutionalized (i.e. IPS˃84) 24 political parties. Moreover, even Montenegro, which is the post-communist country with the strongest (i.e. institutionalized) political parties, occupies a discrete twentyfourth position, very far from those Western (e.g. Austria, Italy, Finland, etc.) and Southern (e.g. Cyprus, Spain) European nations where political parties could be considered to be overinstitutionalized (i.e. IPS˃95).
[ Figure 2 around here]
However, and although political parties tend to be more institutionalized in earlier democratic periods, the contrast is not as straightforward as in the case of PSI. Thus, and even if it is true that most countries democratized between 1945 and 1989 display very high 24 This cut-off point has been chosen according to the following criteria: (1) it displays by far the higher gap in the level of PI between two (consecutive) countries, (2) it perfectly coincides with the average European level of PI in the period under study, (3) it divides the sample in two almost equal clusters, and (4) [ Table 5 around here]
In a similar vein, there seems to be no relationship at all, neither of necessity nor sufficiency (consistency = 0.46 and 0.24, respectively) between democratic collapse and party under-institutionalization. Indeed, the fact that most regimes with under-institutionalized political parties have survived (see Figure 2 ) seems to suggest the almost trivial, if not inexistent, relationship between PI and democracy. This is something that can be observed in the last row of Table 5 which shows a very similar percentage for both consolidated and failed democracies with institutionalized political parties, but not only.
Thus, and even if after WWI regimes with institutionalized political parties tended to survive in a greater extent than those with under-institutionalized political parties, the differences are not very significant (roughly 30 per cent at its most).
For the sake of robustness, it is important to note here that, as it immediately follows also from Tables B and C 
Conclusions
Summarizing an almost unanimous belief within the democratization literature, Mainwaring stated exactly fifteen years ago that 'democracy is likely to have shortcomings if a moderately institutionalized party system does not emerge after democratic government has been in place for some time ' (1999: 6) . Although never satisfactorily tested, the assertion that PSI was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the endurance of democracy became one of the most repeated among both party politics and regime transition scholars. To the point that, driven by the conceptual assimilation embedded in Mainwaring's theoretical framework (Mainwaring 1999; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring and Torcal 2006) , such essential role for democratic survival was extended also to the institutionalization of political parties themselves.
Trying to clarify the extent to which -as repeatedly maintained -both PSI and PI have a positive impact on the endurance of democracy, this article has assessed the abovecited relationship by employing a different methodology on an original dataset, large enough to allow for both cross-national/regional as well as cross-temporal comparisons. These are the main findings.
First of all, and following Randall and Svåsand's (1992) steps, it seems reasonable that PSI and PI are two different, even if related, concepts which should not be conflated. As a result, the former should be operationalized with an eye to excluding indicators that measure aspects at the party, rather than the systemic level. Secondly, it has not been the institutionalization of political parties but the institutionalization of party systems as a whole that has had a positive effect on the prospects for democratic survival in Europe. However, and thirdly, such impact has taken place in a different manner than what most scholars had predicted as PSI has not been a necessary, but a sufficient condition for the survival of European democracies. In fact, democracy has survived in many post-communist countries despite, sometimes even in spite of, extremely inchoate party systems (e.g. Latvia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland, etc.) . What scholars, and politicians, should bear in mind is that continuous lack of PSI 'necessarily' puts democracy in peril, as most pre-WWII European cases demonstrate. Fourthly, and with apologies once again to Schattschneider (1942: 1) ,
European democracies do seem to be unthinkable save in terms of moderately institutionalized party systems. In other words, democracy will never collapse as soon as a certain degree of PSI is reached. At least this is what our historical analysis of 64 different European political regimes reveals. Fifthly, when trying to measure PSI or looking for the ways to avoid democratic collapse, scholars might want to consider putting their focus on the stability of partisan interactions rather than on the volatility of electoral attachments or the number of political parties. Finally, party system over-institutionalization (i.e. iPSI˃3) has not proved as dangerous for the survival of democracy in Europe as some may have predicted (see Coppedge 1994; Schedler 1995) . This is not to deny that excessive levels of institutionalization could harm the quality of a nation's democracy. But this is certainly a topic for future research.
All in all, as Sontheimer already noted almost thirty years ago, 'the stability of the party system [rather than the parties] is the really decisive factor for the stability of the whole system in all democratic systems […] ' (1987: 10) . Notwithstanding the fact that any generalization of the results of this article outside the European continent should be taken with caution, its findings have important implications in terms of how democracy should be promoted as -needless to say -the whole question of democratic survival should be approached with a preferential eye on party systems rather than merely on parties, as it has usually been the case (e.g. Burnell and Gerrits 2012) . In other words, and paraphrasing Pridham (1990: 2) 
